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AI{NUAI C0,ndCI{ }VIARIGT REPORT WARNS MEMBER COID{TRIES
0F ECChlO\,lIC DIFFICULTIES IN 1972
A Suunnary of tire 1971 Annual Report on the Economic Situation in the
European Corrnnity
This yearrs Arrural Economic Report warns the Six that economic prospects
for L972 are dfun because of uncertainty in international ncnetary and economic
affairs.
Ttre Report is the first of its kind designed to help coordinate the
short-term economic policies of the member states with the aim of achieving
eventtral economic and nonetary urion.
In },trarch, 1971, the Council of Ministers issued a decision calling for
the preparation of annual reports to which member cotrntry parLiaments could
refer when discussing national budgets. In addition to providing current
information on the economic situation, the report proposes guidelines for
Comurdty memberst L972 budget policies, structural policies, and adjustrrents
in national instrunents of econcmic policy. The tect, drartrn up by the Eur',opean
Ccnnrnities Comnission, approved by the European Parliarruent,and adopted by
the Cotrncil of Ministers on October 26, L97L, is sr.uunarized belott.
the 1971 situation in t}re Coruu:rity is
ty on the international front, and contirnred
slor.v-down in the domestic domain.
characterized by nonetary uncertain-
inflation cornbined with a business
i-
a
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The Internation4| Irhnetary Crisis 
:r! r : :"f :'!'
. 
- 
.J'lo! only has- the international monetary crisis disturbed the economicequlrr-brltun of nember states, it.has also jeopardized one of the Conrnr.rrityrsmost.desired goals - economii ana monetary',-i;. Faced in l,!ay with an
T::+111!:* pJorth.lr_th" LlS.balance of piyrn:rts deficit due n'iinly to nassiveoutflorrs of tE capitaL- to Etrrope, e€lmanD, ana Ure Netherlands cor:ntered. ttreinflationary Pressure by allovri"g Ureii Lr*u*ius to float. other cornnrniwcountrles (France, Belgiun and Luxembourg) rnodified exclrange reguiitioiu to-
cope with the situation.
lGasures takel by the Lhited States on August 15 pltrnged all the countriesin tlre international monetary systern into an eGn nore Lritfcal sittration.
Given the volune of tE foreign trade, the contirnration of protectionist meazures
taken- b)' that country Trns tf,e risk 6f affecting eryloyment levels and economicgrortth rates ofits trade partners
r_:a _,Witl *,i!)r already strained by the lrhy crisis, Corrnurity cormtries haveta1led, since August-, to define a comnon monetary p6ricy and have appliedwidely divergent exchange rate arrangenents. Ceiminy c6ntinued irr"'!yii*put into effect in l,!ay.- the Beneluc-countries have Secided to float their
currencies jointly, while retaining 4ifferent nrles on capitai rpvernents. T?rertalian cuTrgncy is floati"g Tr-+F fai-rly narrow linits.' FrartCe, ioirroi"gitruBe}e1u1 model, has created ; double exchange market, where cornrercial andrelated transactions are ca:ried out on a fixed exctlange-raiJUasis, *tiiefinancial and tourist transactions are sr:bject to a fl6ating-r"iu.
Jhese-nonetary disturbanc-es and obstacles to world trade have occurredat a tfune when the Cornnnityts_ balance of crrrr"rrt pryrerrti-itrows a sfigf,i--*deficit, in contrast to the zubstantial surpl_trses br recent y""ir.
The C,qnnunityrs Internal Economic Situd.tion
l'bnetary instabilig has coincided with a sLor^rdorn in the rate of economicactivity within t}re Cornrurity.
Ihe voh.rne JlgyTts !o third countries increased very 1itt1e during thesecond qtrarter of 1971, despite a teuporary ilprovement in tire economic
situation in the LJnited States and conntri-es such as the tlrrited Kingdom and
Canada.
Dcmestic investment dropped in nost of the menber states. Ibspite the
sustained level- of sonsr.unpti.onl therefore, overall production did not increase
4Tittg the spring, althorlh it-rernained higher than'at the ena of 1970. Forthis reason, the means ofproduction were io 1-onger used to itu-rrr" extent
as previously.
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Industrial trroduction
(percentage variations in comparison with the index for theprecedingl quarter, corrected- for seasonal variations)
1970 1971
IIwII : III
Comunity
Germany
France
Italy
Netherlands
Belgir.un
Lu:cernbourg
5,2
2,5
4.8
78.7
4.5
- 2.4
- 0.1
- 0,5
- 0.3
- 5.6
- 5.0
- 2.4
6,4
0.L
015
7.2
3.9
0
019
0
3.0
0.4
0
1.4
0.5
4.0
1,0
- 5.f
4.0
4.5
3,7
0.5
4,2
6.4
1.0
- 2,.5
- 0,5
-4
-8
0
z
3
(*) Estimated
The rise in costs and prices ha9 cor,tinued sharply, Wage increases have
remained substantiaL, sometines reaching a-lmqst 15 pLr cent ;nnralLy despite adecrease in tlre rate-of productivity. Ilthough the'Corururnitltrai trla-to
contend with strong inftitionary teirdencies ai a result of iiternationar
monetary p_ressures, the causes of sectoral disturbances in the Uiianie otsupply and demand and the sharp rise in costs have been ,.i"ri a;;ii..
C.onstuner Prices
(percentage increases per quarter)
1970 1971
: III
Cermany
France
Italy
NetherLands
Belgiur
Lrxemborrg
r..9
1.7*
1.9
2.4
1J
t.2
0.8
1.3
1.3
e.9
0.4
L.2
- 0.1
1'o
1|2
2r0
0,7
04
113
1.1
0.8
0.4
0.6
1.1
2.5
1,5
l. .5
3.2
1.8
L.7
L.2
1.6
1.0
1.9
1.0
1.0
(*) Former French index (more)
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The Ortlook
The econqnic qltlook remains partictrlarly urcertairri in viemr of the
mcnetary instability and the adorptibn of protettioniit-lreadre;-by-td ttrituastates. cqmnity_ocports to third cor.mtiies *il u" fi;;it-ctrf;gtJ btthe.rypreciation br rnbst nember rtateri crrrrenCi"r and the ndvtv-"r"cted LxStrade barriers. wtrereas tle econonric fuerovdelra-rt iA-hrd';;"i, to takeplace in the rtrited states, canada ard-ii;-urfia rtr;ga; h.d-Frqnisea
accelerated Colrumrnity sales to third countries, extertal denranb itn r expectedto stagnate.
,..^ .^T--!::t for the e:cpansion of dendnd within the Conm.rnity are also dim,clue to ecpected inrrestnent and con$fiption trenls. Irhneta* l#tafifiii- -- '
new obstacles to trade and capitat mcirenents, a-Urrsinesi iiir*aom, cont'inueapro&rction cost pressures on ieinvestment ,aigi*, and a a;p-il ihe rate ofpro&rction factor utilization point to a Lesi-riorabiu-.iirnit" for cornercialinrrestments. Ctrrent trends iir inafviaot pia"i rduiitii*r;a-irr"-i."'*iii-of enquiries to the heads of connprcial busintri"r ,lr"aay aie-headed inthe same direction.
There will be a considerable increase in incqe per ho.usehold in LglZ,but tlre rate of increase is likely to drop duriru tfr" i,u". r*in-iv are toa slotrer increase in wage 1eve1s iornrineahith i:reduciiori in ii:Zr Eine-iorked.
Ttre Corur,rri{ faceq-lp oppt diffic'r{t situation since its creation. I\bt
t]te L969 and Ls70 boom )rears,'-but it'atso tus'io-ie:"rtfridri'-#i;-A;iiU"i.,r,in a climate of extrenre urceitainty in internaiio*r-ffii"# i"a comnercialaffairs
A return to balanced gro{'th for the rreniber states raises arckruardpPllqls for the coordinatidn of strort-term 
".oncrrii poricleil 
-rt" 
retentionof different exchange ayangenenls in nrenber states rclr rrna"*i"" pievious-
cormunity actrievenentl i1,e-gnorync.integration 1nd wili pL;;--iL cor,,rorityin an inferior position vis-6-vis its rfiior tr"au parrners. 
.An 
"r$i rritto cost inflation, tlrereftre, conbined with the ejtatrrishnent of uriformglctangg rate policies,is irrperative. certain si"riiir;-til; p;iicies whichttre rrarious nember states haire adopted_arso endanger-d;-aAiiuri.rm of thecommity. These will have to be LriminateJ as-s6on ." pojJiui".
The nrernber statgs ,1}1-elEeriemce inflation and an econqnic s1ohr-d6qmin varying.degrees. The difficirlty qr.arrying *it. coordinated n ii;- "at Ccmmurdty 1evol lies not 9n1y iir suctr vaitafions but aLso in the attitudesof the member states' econcmic iuthorities. -ufte" a"i;*i"i"g t"idriry]it 
"J"n 1l gptoyment and.stabilit)r, they-rust rearizJ trrai-lh.;id;,ry of national.g*.i:iu:-i: ry1" and.more re-sirictbd by the increasing i"tilJ.e*a*.e of theIIEmber states'econonies-- Any atteilpt to return to coiplete autononry wouLdharm t}te interests of a1.1. '
A rettrrn to stability lemains the Cornnrrityts prfurc objective, but the
.trgi.g, the breadth, Bnd the timiTg-of ttrJ mear-rs't" 6"-uuei&Ij *1r u"guided by the need to ensure condilions for rcdirmr-term grrntt.
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T?re rise in prices shouLd be gradually reduced to an anrual level of
.about 3 !o 1.5 per cent in the last-quarter of L972, and wage increases shouldbe contained at an annual rate of abdut 6 to 7 per ient. If such results
are to be obtained between ncn^r and the end of ttllZ without damage to the
gronrth rate, the economic and social- policy of aLL the nernber sfates mrst have
the support of workers and employers.
The authorities of the mernber states should endeavor, during the
coming nonths, to apply further brakes to the growth of monetary and quasi-
monetary liquid assets, partictrlarly in cormtries where this increase has
been very great in 1970 and the first half of 1971. This aim can be attainedby a strict re,gulation of bank liquidity, by a greater control of capital
infl.ot^ls and, where necessary, by the neutralization of their e:rpansionist
effect on internal liquidity.
Budgetary policy should aim at maintaining cost increase at a rate
similar to the predicted increase in the vaLue of the gross national product,
subject to any budgetary adjusfinents that rnight have to be made in the event
of a pronounced short-term falling-off in economic actirrity. Within theselimits, an effort should be made to leave sufficient scope for infra-
stnrctural erpenditure. In other words, the distortion which has recently
developed between the rapid increase of individual- consurption and sluggishpttblic works expenditure should be remedied.
Finally, the stimulation of saving and the encouragement of long-termfinancial invesfitent remain indispensable fo, the achievement of morebalanced growth.
National GbideLines
GERIvIAI{Y
Better control-o{ Price and cost trends should remain a prfune concerrlof the public authorities. --'---- - r-
The de facto revaluation of the Deutschemark has limited the expansionof fgpign demand.. sr ,pp"opriate por.icy for regul"ii"t-a;*stic aemandshould norr be carried out-. A cauti6us credit p"iiii *iir-rir" b" ,r".urrrrydqin8 tfre gorninq months. 
,This rtrill require tight lo"tior-o"ur-frr*-iiqiiity,and regulation of financial flortrs to and' from f6reign ;;unt;i;;.
In the budgetary field.r.the return.to greater stabiLity requires thatfederal and state cash_e:rpenditure, considerEa as a ;61;,-;irdid not increasebymore than 7.5 to 8.5 pbr cent in L97z and, that the net'balanie to befinanced from the total federal and state budget should be about-$i.g--billion. Shotrld-a Pronoulced slorudo,,m in ttre"ihort-term economic sitgationbecone apparent {"i}e Lgzz, the coverrunent would ha;-A;-;i:rrd oi ,ouiiirirrgreseryes frozen in the short-term contingenry fund. I -
(more)
The currenqr revaLuations of certain major trading partnersr, both in
and outside the Cbnummity, initially wiLl have an infLationary effect on
the economy. Ttre relationship betr.leen ilport agrd e:cport price-s s-hould be
watched c1bse1y. The retura to greater stability cornbined with further
ocpansion rgquires increased investrrrent both in the F$1ic and private sectors
anil econonicatty satisfactory trends in cons"uner spending.
Credit policy should be ained at slonring the elqans-i_o1_9f liquid
assets, utrich has been partiorlarly rapid since aufiIm of 1970. Ittis
inrolves ap'propriate controls and nzutialization of short-term capital
inflcntrs and aplropriate use of the controldevice for bank liquidity.
In the hrdgetary field, strict ilBnagenent is stilL required. The
increase in state expierditure should not exceed 9 per cent. While it would
be desirable in L972'to achieve a- slight cash surplus, the national budget
should, in any case, be balanced.
The need to end inflation calls -- in addition to appro.priate short-
term nBasures -- for prrblic action to assist deueloprent in the fieLds of
vocational training aira norsing', and to inprove corifretition in the so-
called sheltered sectors.
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FRAI{CE
ITATY
Priority should be given to raising the Level of production. Success
depends primarily on iuproveurent of the social cLimate. It also requires, a
sti:nrlati.ng econonic policy uhich uouLd arrcid intengifying inflationary
tremds. Tfiis Last aspect is especially urportant since ttre introduction of
tlre Value-Added Tax, erpected in Ju1y, L972; involves Large-scaLe ctranges
in price structure
Authorities shcnrld exercise control over a1-1 liquid assets, which
have been expanding rapidly in the last eighteem months. Credit erpangion
shouLd be limited so that the gramth of nominal denand rernafuE proportional
to the increase in pro&rction capacity.
ftre br.lilget should supply the necessary incentive for an acceleration
of econcnic a-tivity. An lncrease of 11 to LZ per cent in real expe,nditure
frour the 1971 level is recorsnended. Such arr increase, taking into accornt
the forecast developnent of resources, would bring the deficit to be
financed by the state to about $4 bilLion in L972. Expenditures likely to
stimllate imresfrilent, particularly in the building sector, are encouraged.
Eperdittnes stimrlatrng hotrsehold consturption should be made cautiously.
Contact maintained with the representativos of various sociaL gtotlps'
especially whe,lr the Value-Added Tax is intro&rced, wi1-l be useful to avoid
a price-wage spiral.
Indirect tax rel.ief couLd contribnrte to economic stabilization and
a fairer distribution of the national incole.
Vigorous restrictions on dorBstic deilnard are required to safeguard
longer-term powth potential .
In viehr of the contirnring rise in prices (5.2 per cent between Decernber ancl
June 19711^rpnetary policy stroufd continue to be restrictive &rring the
coning rpiritrs. It should be srpplannnted b'}' control of excessive capital
infl.ors.
Btrdgetary policy shouLd rernain strict and fnrgaL. Ttre growth of state
e:cpenditr.re should be heLd to beLow 10 per cent.
A sharp redrrction in the net balance to be- financedr 
-qp to a 1eve1 of
about $A+f rniffion, is advised. If necesSary,- there shouLd be ternporary
recourse to fisiai pressure througlr furposing the short'term surta:c, levied
nainly upon incone.
Budget austerity should be applied-in ways which wil.l not affect
regional investnent and vocational training.
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NET}MRI.,AI{DS
BELGIIIM
LII)(Rts0IIRG
Itre main economic policy problem will remain that of npderating price
trenas, 
"rp"ci"ffy since a nriribir of adjusfrnents.have 
been delayed by the
exte'nsion bf pricb controLs coinciding wittr ttre introdr.rction of the Value-
Added Tax.
A policy strictly Lirriting the expans-ion of donestic demand should be
applifi ;it6irtriltio! enpfoy,r6nt or giorttr-rate. Ttre authorities shouldi6iti""" to'apply a coilsenrative monetiry poLicy to control liquidity'
Regarding social policy rrnasures that canre into force in mid-1971 and
those piionJaEor L9TZ, certiin tlpes 9f gons$er.erpendittre.and public .
investirent cormitnants'should be iirrtailed. Ilespite such cautionr-tlrere is;iii 
" 
iiti tf,"i it"t" e:cpenditure may incrgaqg sharply (between L0 andii il, fiil,-puit"ps neceisilali{E intre.ased direct tarcation and consoli-
a"tlo" ;i air" in Uril-auUt. Limitiilg the bal-ance to be financed out of the
state hrdget to $53 million is advisable.
In the event of a short-term econonic slordown, the authorities should
adopt 
" 
,efi-iir*d,'f1exib1e policy-to. sr.prport dorestic dernand, in accordance
witir the general provisions o-rttined.above.
Tlre srccess pf efforts to stabilize the economy.depe'mds to a great
extent on a heaft$ econornrcsituation in otlre: countries. l'trerrertheLess,
tlr" ;rd.r"rities rt6ufa stiive to achieve graduaLly adequate stability 9f .
*ttr-;a-tri."r.---Ttrt sttorfa stagger pubLic-ocpendittre 1n 9r$9r to l"tunit
ttt" U"i*"b to be finairced otrt of tf,e national budget to about $32 ni11ion.
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Stnrcfirral Policv at Cqrmrnity Lpvel
Corrnnrity authorities mrst ensurle that ttre free nprrcrnent of goods
within the Cq 
.rrpn l,larket and tJre s.ibseqrent conryetitirre pressure onprices are not obstnrcted by ca:tels or'irregulli practices by firms
enjoyirU a dmiJtant position. ft vdI1 also be necessary to see that
conpbtition is not s-eriously threatened by exeggemtod -concentration in
certain sectors.
To resolve the confllct betr+een Security of enplqnnent an{ professional
mobility, tlre Conuun:ity should protect workers rpre effecti.vely against'
risks of reduced or lost incqe &rring periods of vocational retraining.
A coordinated policy in this area should be str.died by the nemiber states.
The Ccrrmrrrity rust intensify its efforts to assist tnderderreloped
regions, especially those sihrated in the outlylng parts of the Colrunmity.
Finally, the Courunity will harc to pay $pecial attention to all
matters relatirry to erlironmental protection arld improvenent.
Adaptation of Econcrnic Poliqf InStnrments
National economic policy instnnrents mtst be adapted to tlre nenr
requirerents of coordinated economic policies l.eading to zul economic and
monetary union.
Instnnents of short-term polic1 especially budgetary policy, should
be given greater flexibility. I,lerfrer states wlilch do rxit already have tlre
rlnarrs to adjust rapidLy t€xation and experdihre leveIs shotrld adopt thern,
Ihis is essentiaL if tlp natioRal authorities are to aply a policy of price
and cost upderation, lrithsut n.rrrllitig ttre risk of slotrifi! bo^tn- econbmic L'rourtfrfor an rrnacceptable length of tine.
In ttre field of international monetary reLations, the Comnurity nnrst
extricate itself frgm i.ts situation while s its nonetary
solidarity. A means be developed to stabitize interna 1 capital
flqrrs, dnd, whlre appr_qriate, to netrtraLize their effects upon internalliquidit)'. sudr arrayrrgirpnts-rrculd allorrr limited exclu4gg rite flexibilityin relation to the cr.rnenc-ies of third cormtries, rvhile exctrange rates between
tlre nermber states would remain fixed.
